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THE COLLEGE OF LAw.-The College of Law opened in September
with an attendance of ninety-one, or seven more than last year's
enrollment. This increase is in the first-year class which numbers
forty-four as compared with thirty-six in 1921.
There has been no change in the faculty since the last issue
of the Quarterly.
The construction of the new law building is progressing steadily
and it will be easily completed next summer. The opening of
school in the new law building in the fall of 1923 will mark the
forty-fifth year of the College of Law.
THE VALIDITY OF TRusTs FOR AccuMuLATioN UNDER THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETuITIEs.-Projects for the posthumous control of
property seem to have a most profound appeal to some deep-rooted
instinct in humanity. In a noticeably large number of cases it
seems that men successful in amassing large accumulations of
wealth become obsessed with the idea of perpetuating to utmost
future time their amassed fortunes. Perhaps the iron-hearted dis-
cipline with which, as is popularly supposed, they apply their lives
1
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to business, builds up in them, in time, what the newer psycholo-
gist might call a money "complex," and leads to their evaluation
of the ultimate worth of their careers in terms of the size and
permanency of their estates.
A favorite and time-honored plan for pecuniary self-perpetu-
ation is that of creating, by will, trusts for accumulation. An his-
toric instance of this was the famous Thellusson will. Peter Thel-
lusson, who died in England in 1797, left an estate in trust, for
accumulation, which was so vast that it was apparent that the eco-
nomic and social consequences would be far-reaching and threat-
ening to the realm. The courts upheld the validity of the will,1 but
the Parliament took action against the practice of creating such
trusts.
2
And even before the incidence of the Thellusson Cases the courts,
without interposition of Parliament, had worked out the rule
against perpetuities, 4 which has proved an effective bar to schemes
providing for the devolution of property through successive gene-
rations of a designated family or families. This restricfive rule
of law is, however, highly technical and, as laid down in the books,
is confined in its application to a comparatively narrow field. It
is not the purpose of the rule against perpetuities to prescribe a
limit for the duration of estates, whether present or future, wheth-
er vested or contingent. A testator or grantor may, by his will in
one case or by his deed in the other, make an arrangement pro-
viding for the holding in trust of certain property and the payment
of the income therefrom to a given line of devisees or grantees for-
ever, and yet escape the inhibitions of the rule against perpetui-
ties.5 The rule against perpetuities concerns itself only with the
point of time at which estates are to commence. It prescribes an
arbitrary period, measured from the time of their attempted cre-
ation, after which estates may not vest. Its name is therefore
misleading. It would more properly be called the rule against
remoteness of vesting.
A will speaks as of the date of the death of the testator. It may
therefore, provide for the vesting or commencing after the testa-
' Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Yes. 227 (1798), 11 yes 112 (1805).
2 St. 39 & 40 Geo. III, c. 98. For a discussion of this act see GRAY, RUIZ
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., Appendix B, §§ 686-727.
3 For the history of the rule see GRAY, supra, §§ 123-200.
' The rule provides that no interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not
later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the time of the creation
of the interest. This short statement of the rule is, however, not unobjectionable.
A. M. Kales, "Several Problems of Gray's Rule Against Perpetuities," 20 HARV.
L. Rev. 192.
5 Such arrangement would, however, probably fall afoul of the independent
but related rule against restraints upon alienation.
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tor's death of any estate in the named devisees within the period
which is prescribed, somewhat arbitrarily, by the rule. If, then, a
testator devises his property to designated trustees, to take at
once for investment and accumulation of income for a period how-
ever long, and the trust is so limited that legal title at once vests
in the fiduciaries and the equity of cestuis que trustent vests
simultaneously in the designated beneficiaries, the trust would not
be at all repugnant to the rule against perpetuities simply by rea-
son of the length of time prescribed for accumulation. An attempt
to contrive a trust to arise or begin to function too remotely in
time would, however, probably fall squarely within the purview
of the rule. And if moreover, it is provided that the trustees shall
take for accumulation and that, pending the accumulation, the in-
tended beneficiaries thereof shall not have the equity of cestuis,
or any other vested estate or interest in and to the trust res and its
accruing income, and, for instance, shall only take a share of the
estate, with its accretions, in case they survive the period of the
trust, the case is different. In such ease the situation of those
ultimately to become the beneficiaries of the accumulation and the
distributees of the corpus of the estate, with its accretions, is, pend-
ing the accumulation, somewhat peculiar. They would doubtless
be entitled to appeal to the courts to see to it that the trustees
observe strictly the requirements of the trust. Pending the trust,
they have a contingent future interest in the estate and in the
successive accretions thereto of such nature that when it vests, if
ever, it will become absolute and indefeasible. Their interest,
pending the accumulation, is therefore precisely the kind of inter-
est which must vest at a not too remote point of time, to be valid
under the rule against perpetuities.
Such was the situation in a recent West Virginia case.6 In that
case a testator provided for a trust which was essentially one for
accumulation, and directed that the accumulation should continue
until January 1, 1950. The testator died in 1920. The provision
in question therefore required accumulation for a gross period of
thirty years. In itself this would not have been invalid under the
rule against perpetuities. But it was further provided that, pend-
ing the expiration of this period, the interest of he devisees should
remain contingent and that upon the expiration of the designated
period, the trust should be extinguished and the corpus of the
estate, with its accumulations, should then and only then go abso-
6 Pritchard v. Pritchard, 113 S. E. 256, (W. Va. 1922).
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lutely to such of certain designated beneficiaries as should sur-
vive to that time. This latter proviso was therefore one which
made it possible that, under it, estates might commence or vest as
late as thirty years after the death of the testator.7
The court correctly held this provision of the will invalid. For,
as very ably set out in the opinion, the rule against perpetuities
is not a rule of intention or construction. As has been frankly
said by the leading authority upon the law of future interests,
"Its object is to defeat intention." 8  But it only defeats an inten-
tion which is, under the rule, unlawful. And the rule is only ap-
plied after the work of construing the instrument and of arriving
at the intent of the testator, or other user of the words being con-
sidered, is done. The intent is arrived at as if the rule did not exist
and if the intent is found to be that estates provided for are to
vest at a period too remote, the rule is remorselessly applied, de-
feating the intent.9
In the case mentioned it was correctly held that since the clear
intent was to provide that the estate should- vest absolutely in cer-
tain proportions in certain designated beneficiaries, at a period
too remote under the rule, that portion of the will so providing
must be held invalid. The most novel and interesting question
presented by the case arises just here. If the trust for accumula-
tion itself be valid,10 but it is provided that at its expiration cer-
tain estates shall arise, or vest, which latter provision is invalid
under the rule against remoteness, why not allow the trust itself
to stand ?
In another recent case the West Virginia Court had said:
"Where it appears that a part of the testator's general
scheme is to control the devolution of his estate for an unlawful
period, no part of such scheme can be sustained, and such
provision will be void in toto, even though the testator might
have validly controlled the vesting of his estate in part, as
indicated in such provision."I"
But in that case the component provisions of testator's general
scheme thus adverted to were not provisions creating a trust for
accumulation, but provisions in the nature of conditional limita-
7 There is some authority to the effect that where no lives in being are mentioned
in the limitation, the validity of which under the rule against perpetuities is
being examined, the estate or estates In question must vest within a gross period
of twenty-one years. Andrews v. Lincoln, 95 Me. 541, 50 Atl., 898 (1901).
s Gav, supra, § 629.
9 GRaY, supra, § 629.
10 Validity only so far as the rule against perpetuities is concerned, is here
meant.
31 McCreery v. Johnston, Syl. pt. 8, 90 W. Va., 80, 110 S. E. 464, (1922).
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tions. Hence that case, while cited to sustain the position taken
in the case being considered, is not strictly in point in
this connection. It is interesting to note that the question of
the effect of a provision for a trust, the objects of which are ac-
cumulation and postponement of the vesting of absolute title in the
devisees, had been suggested but had remained undecided:
"If the main object of an executory trust were to create
too remote limitations, so that apart from such object there
remained nothing substantial to carry out, it is probable that
the whole trust would fail, although there is no case so
holding."
1 2
These words appear in the 1915 edition of Gray's work and may be
taken to establish that, when they were written, the question was
still an open one. A somewhat casual search has failed to reveal
any American case between that date and the decision now being
considered which squarely raised and decided the effect of an at-
tempt to create a trust for the purpose noted. And in that ease
there was, in the opinion of the court, such an attempt. There the
trust for accumulation was made, as it were, a peg from which to
suspend executory devises otherwise void. With the devises, the
court holds, must also fall their support. The Court said:
"The whole purpose of creating the trust was to preserve
the property so that it might pass to those intended by the
testator on the 1st day of January 1950, and inasmuch as that
purpose is invalid the whole scheme by which it was intended
to accomplish it will fall."13
It is believed that the solution of this very interesting and novel
question thus worked out is quite correct from the legal view point.
And it may be welcomed as one more blow at prolonged posthumous
control of property. STANLEY C. MORRIS.
Clarksburg, W. Va.
THE ANSwER IN EQUITY AS EVIDENCE IN WEST VIRGiNIA.-The
opinion has long prevailed, it is believed among the great majority
of practitioners in West Virginia, that an answer in equity in this
state is in no case evidence for the *defendant. This opinion, it
13 GRAY, supra, § 418. It is believed that, while it might be said that the trust
provided for in Prichard v. Prichard, supra Is not executory, it Is the kind of
trust which the learned writer quoted believed to be invalid.
1 Prichard v. Prichard, supra.
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